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The Economics of Medicare Reform
Around the globe, entitlement programs for the elderly are at a crossroads.  Without
fundamental reform, the rapidly approaching retirement of the post war baby-boom generation
will cause another boom in the form of higher tax rates on workers or a bust in the form of
reduced benefits to retirees.  As in many other developed countries, the United States’ elderly
entitlements—Medicare and Social Security—are supported by transfers from the young to the
old.  The question is, how will the United States and other countries prepare for the retirement of
the baby boom?  Because the programs are financed by taxes, the question is one of crucial
importance in terms of public policy.
Reforming Medicare and Social Security go hand in hand.  The solutions to Social
Security’s financing problems are applicable to those of Medicare.  Working within the context of
transfer-payment financing, the possible solutions involve tax hikes, benefit reductions, reductions
in other federal programs, or combinations of all three.  Left unchecked, Medicare and Social
Security spending will consume 11.7 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product by 2030, up
66 percent from their current share.  Paying for these elderly entitlements using tax revenues will
require a tax rate approaching 30 percent of taxable earnings.  Alternatively, balancing the budget
at current tax rates would require substantial future benefit cuts. 
For some time now, the prepayment of all or some of future retirement Social Security
benefits has been discussed in policy circles as an answer to the problems inherent in
transfer-payment financing, but regardless of the route taken, one generation or several
generations will bear the burden of the system’s implicit debt.  Future benefit reductions place the
burden on future retirees, who are today’s  workers.  Increasing taxes in future years places the
burden on future taxpayers who are today’s young.  Prepayment places the burden on current
workers.  So, in some ways, benefit cuts in the future and prepayment are equivalent.  Further,
because transfer-payment financing of retirement expenditures suppresses saving and, as a result,
reduces the capital stock, current workers have lower wages than they would have had with a
funded program.
In our book The Economics of Medicare Reform, prepayment of retirement health
insurance is studied as part of a sweeping proposal to reform the Medicare program.  Prepayment
of elderly consumption has several advantages over the current unfunded system, the main one
being a higher capital stock and higher national income.  In addition, while prepayment requires
current workers to pay for their own retirement and that of current retirees, it also releases
subsequent generations from onerous tax rates.
In contrast to Social Security, which is an unrestricted cash transfer, Medicare provides
health insurance coverage.  The cost of providing that coverage has grown at rates that have far
outpaced the growth in other expenditures.  Between 1970 and 1998, real Medicare expenditures
per enrollee grew at a rate of 4.8 percent, while real Social Security benefits grew at a rate of 1.7
percent, so an answer to the Medicare funding problems must address both the population bulge
and the size of and growth in real expenditures.  In our book, we also analyze the benefits of
converting Medicare’s two-part insurance package to a single higher-deductible policy for future
retirees.  This type of health coverage makes consumers care what health care costs and can play
a major role in restoring competition to the industry.  The higher-deductible policy will reduce the
cost of the transition to a prepaid system and may well affect expenditure growth. 
The strain that Medicare has placed (and will place) on government finances was not lost
on those who passed the legislation.  Even before its passage, powerful members of Congress
predicted that the program would require escalating tax rates and increases in the taxable
maximum.  Interestingly, reviewing the debates that led up to Medicare’s passage also remind us
that many of the proposals currently being discussed—including choice, means testing, vouchers,
and even prepayment—have historical antecedents. 
Unfortunately, we cannot go back to 1965 and choose among the options that were on the
table then.  The institution of Medicare in 1965 was a boon for members of the original retired
generation, who immediately received benefits without paying any taxes.  Today, the current
working generation must recognize the system’s debt in developing a means to finance the
program.
We evaluated several transition scenarios that differed by the rate-of-return assumptions
and by the benefit package that is prepaid.  The common features of the scenarios included
moving all baby boomers into the prepaid system of individual retirement health insurance
accounts and requiring all individuals to contribute to an insurance account that pays for their
medical care during retirement.  In the simplest construction, all individuals of a given age engage
in a mutual insurance compact that begins when they enter the labor force and lasts through
retirement.  Contribution rates to the insurance accounts are periodically updated as more
information about future health care expenditures is known.
By investing in private accounts, workers can prepay their retirement health insurance at
rates that are lower than the implied Medicare tax.  Any differential between the current implied
Medicare taxes and the cost of prepayment goes toward funding the older cohorts—those born
before 1946—who remain in the conventional Medicare system.  The younger cohorts’
contributions are also used to subsidize the prepayment of most of the baby boomers’ retirement
health care.  A final common feature in each simulated transition is the imposition of a transitional
tax to cover its cost.
One of the transition paths we analyzed involves replacing the current Medicare package
in full.  Figure 1 shows the simulation results for the cost of making the transition to a prepaid
system versus the cost of retaining the current pay-as-you-go financing.  By the 16th year,
workers pay less in taxes and contributions to their retirement health insurance accounts than they
would in taxes if the current pay-as-you-go Medicare financing system is retained.  In all future
years, workers pay lower taxes than would be needed to finance Medicare on a pay-as-you-go
basis.  As Medicare is replaced with fully funded real investment, the nation’s capital stock will
increase and provide the resources necessary to fund the retirement medical care of the baby
boomers and protect the rights of older generations to retirement medical care.
